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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of interfer-
ence attacks for cooperative spectrum sensing in a centralized
cognitive radio network comprising N cognitive radios (CRs)
and one fusion center (FC) in the presence of a fixed interferer.
The design metric chosen is the error probability. We prove the
existence of a saddle-point in the minimax game between the
interferer and the CR network. An optimal solution is found
that maximizes the objective with respect to the interferer’s
parameters and minimizes the same with respect to the CR
network’s parameters. We show that the probability of error
is a quasi-convex function with respect to the network’s param-
eters and a monotone function with respect to the interferer’s
parameters. We also present numerical results that corroborate
our theoretical results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) technology has received significant
recent attention by many researchers due to the spectrum
scarcity caused by growing demand. In order to accommo-
date upcoming applications, FCC started looking for practical
solutions, one of which being the use of cognitive radios
implemented over software-defined radios [1]. An important
function of a cognitive radio is spectrum sensing where the
radio scans the surrounding environment and finds the unused
frequency bands of the licensed users (primary users) for use
by secondary users. But since one radio is spatially limited
while scanning the surroundings, in order to cope with the
hidden terminal problem, cooperative spectrum sensing has
been proposed [2]. Extensive research has been done in the
literature regarding cooperative spectrum sensing, but security
threats to this function have not been given much attention.
Security threats in CR networks can primarily be classified
into two types - intrinsic and extrinsic attacks. Intrinsic attacks
are the attacks on the network from within. Some of these
attacks are Byzantine attacks and routing misbehavior attacks.
Attacks from outside sources are called extrinsic attacks and
examples include eavesdropping, jamming and primary-user
emulation attacks (PUEAs). In this paper, we investigate
the problem of interfering attacks over cooperative spectrum
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sensing in centralized CR networks. For more details on other
possible attacks on CRs, the reader can refer to [3].
Interference attacks have always been focussed in the past
as jamming attacks on one channel at a time and the problem
has been solved in the context of minimax games [4] under
different channel scenarios. Spread spectrum techniques have
been offered as protection against jamming attacks [5], but
seldom was this problem considered in the context of cognitive
radio networks. PUEA is a special type of jamming where
the attacker tries to emulate the primary user to disrupt the
network. Li et al. [6] present this problem in a multiple channel
framework, where the radio tries to move from one channel
to another in order to evade jamming attacks as a one-stage
minimax game as well as a multi-stage stochastic game. In this
paper, we consider an interference attack which generalizes
PUEAs by not just considering the source-sensor channel, but
also the sensor-FC channel. This allows us to ensure better
protection against interference threats in cooperative spectrum
sensing.
We assume that the interferer has limited energy resources
which it uses to disrupt or deteriorate the performance of
the network. Specifically, we focus on two different channels
in this paper, one being the target (PU) to spectrum sensor
(CR) channel and the other being the transmission channel
between the sensor and the fusion center which makes the
global spectrum sensing decision. Therefore, the interferer
tries to distribute its resources over the two available vulner-
able options, while the network on the other hand, tries to
protect itself from the interferer by manipulating its parameters
which include the local quantizer threshold within the sensor
and the threshold used in the fusion rule. Thus, we present a
minimax formulation and prove the existence of a solution to
this problem in this paper.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. We present
some basic definitions and useful results from game theory
in Section II. In Section III, we present the system model
considered and the assumptions over which we build the
minimax formulation. We also introduce the design metric
used in this paper, the error probability of the network and
present how this can be analytically computed in terms of both
the network’s and interferer’s parameters. Next, we formulate
our minimax problem in Section IV. In Section V, we analyze
the error probability as a function of both the network’s and
interferer’s parameters and prove the existence of a solution
to the formulation presented in Section IV. Furthermore, we
present numerical results to corroborate our analytical results
in Section VI. Finally, we conclude the paper with Section VII
by summarizing the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce some basic definitions and
theorems in game theory that are useful in this paper.
Let (S,u) denote a game played by N players, where
S = S1 × · · · × SN is the space of strategy profiles and
u = {u1(s1), · · · , uN (sN )} be the payoff function corre-
sponding to the strategy profile s = {s1, · · · , sN} ∈ S adopted
by the N players. If si is the strategy chosen by player-i,
then we denote s−i = {s1, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sN} as the set
of strategies chosen by the players other than player-i in the
game.
Definition 1 (Normal-form game). A game (S,u) is said to
be represented in its normal-form if it is presented in the form
of a matrix.
Definition 2 (Finite Game). A game (S,u) is said to be finite
if the strategy-profile space S is a finite set.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium). Strategy s ∈ S is a Nash
Equilibrium for the game (S,u) if ui(s) ≥ ui(sˆi, s−i), ∀sˆi ∈
Si, i = 1, · · · , N .
In other words, Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a strategy profile
where, no player can deviate unilaterally in order to increase
his payoff. Nash’s biggest contribution to game theory is the
following theorem in his classic paper [7], where he proved
the existence of a NE for a class of normal-form games.
Theorem 1 (Nash, [7]). Every finite game in normal form
has a NE in either mixed or pure strategies.
In the case of continuous games, the existence of a NE
has been proved for some special cases such as games with
convex-concave utility functions. The following theorem is a
useful generalization to the Nash’s equilibrium theorem for
continuous games, where the saddle point is proved under the
assumption of quasi-concave-convexity.
Theorem 2 (Nikaido, [8]). Let X and Y be any two compact
sets. If K(x, y) is any function that is quasi-concave in x ∈ X
and quasi-convex in y ∈ Y , then there exists a unique (x, y) ∈
X × Y such that
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
K(x, y) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
K(x, y). (1)
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a CR network model with N CRs (or spectrum
sensors), each indexed as i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and one fusion
center FC trying to detect whether a Primary User (PU) T
is transmitting (H1 hypothesis ) or not ( H0). Let the prior
probabilities of the hypotheses be P (H0) = p0 and P (H1) =
p1 = 1 − p0. Also, we assume that a stationary interferer is
present at distances dJ,i, dJ,fc from the ith CR and the FC
respectively which jams both the CR (sensing channel) and
FC (communication channel) receptions by injecting noise-
like signals. These individual jamming signals are denoted as
ws and wfc respectively, where ws ∼ N (0, σ2Ws) and wfc ∼N (0, σ2Wfc). We also assume that the attacker has a reasonable
total power constraint over its transmissions, given by σ2Ws +
σ2Wfc ≤ PJ . Therefore, the interferer would choose its attack
by optimizing the power distribution of noise-like signals over
the N different CRs’ and the FC’s receptions.
Without any loss of generality, we assume that the transmit-
ting power of the PU is A = 1 under hypothesis H1 or A = 0
under H0. Hence, the signal received at the CR is given by
ri = hiA+ ni + hJiws (2)
where hi is the channel gain for the corresponding target-to-
ith CR channel, hJi is the channel gain for the interferer-to-ith
CR channel and ni ∼ N (0, σ2s ). The CR sends its received
signal (raw data) to the fusion center through a communication
channel. Therefore, the received signal rfc is given by
rfc =
N∑
i=1
gi.ri + nfc + gJwfc (3)
where gi is the path-loss coefficient for the corresponding
ith CR-to-FC channel, gJ is the path-loss coefficient for the
interferer-to-FC channel and nfc ∼ N (0, σ2fc). In this paper,
all the path-loss coefficients are assumed to be known to both
the attacker and FC.
The optimal fusion rule is given by the likelihood ratio rule
as follows.
p(rfc|H1)
p(rfc|H0)
H1
≷
H0
p0
p1
(4)
In order to find the optimal fusion rule, we evaluate the con-
ditional probability distributions, p(rfc|H1) and p(rfc|H0).
Note that, the CR receptions r = {r1, · · · , rN} are dependent
on each other because of the presence of the common inter-
ference signal ws. Since ws, n1, n2, · · · , nN are independent
Gaussian noises, it is easy to show from Equation (2) that
the conditional joint distribution of r is normally distributed.
Therefore, we have rfc|Hk ∼ N (µk, σ2), k = 0, 1, where
µ0 = E(rfc|H0) = 0 (5a)
µ1 = E(rfc|H1) =
N∑
i=1
gihi (5b)
and
σ2 = V ar(rfc|H0)
= σ2fc + g
2
Jσ
2
Wfc
+
(
N∑
i=1
gi
)2
σ2s +
(
N∑
i=1
gihJi
)2
σ2Ws
(6)
Hence, the likelihood ratio fusion rule, given by Equation (4),
can be reduced to
rfc
H1
≷
H0
λ (7)
Note that, the optimal λ also depends on the choice of
attacker’s parameters, σWs and σWfc . Therefore, we treat λ
as the parameter that determines network’s strategy.
In this paper, we consider the probability of error, PE , as
the performance metric (utility function of the minimax game),
which is given as follows.
PE = p0QF + p1(1−QD). (8)
where,
QF = P (rfc ≥ λ|H0) (9a)
QD = P (rfc ≥ λ|H1) (9b)
Now, we investigate the impact of interferer’s strategy
(choice of σWs and σWfc , that maximizes PE) and the best
possible counter-attack from the network’s perspective through
an optimal choice of the threshold λ that minimizes PE .
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate a minimax game framework
where, the interferer on the one hand, optimizes its attack
within the available resources, while the network, on the other
hand, chooses an optimal strategy (design) to improve its
performance. The solution to this minimax game between the
network and the attacker is the Nash equilibrium (NE), which
is a saddle point in the design metric, PE .
Thus, our problem formulation is as follows.
Problem Statement. Prove the existence of NE and find
{λ, σWs , σWfc} such that
min
λ
max
σ
PE = max
σ
min
λ
PE
under the constraint
σ2Ws + σ
2
Wfc
≤ PJ
(10)
where σ = {σWs , σWfc}.
In the next section, we present some analytical results that
allow us to find the optimal minimax strategies for the above
mentioned formulation.
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In the minimax game between the centralized CR network
and the interferer, the network has one strategy parameter,
λ, while the interferer has control on σws and σwfc . Nash-
Equilibrium (NE) to a game exists if there exists a saddle-
point in the performance metric considered (in our case,
error probability) which is a function of both network’s and
attacker’s strategies, as given by Equation (8).
In this context, it is easy to show that the expressions for
QF and QD in Equations (9a) and (9b) are as follows.
QF = Q
(
λ
σ
)
(11a)
QD = Q


λ− ·
N∑
i=1
gi · hi
σ

 (11b)
So, we investigate the behavior of the performance metric
(error probability) as a function of network’s and interferer’s
strategies. We first present the behavior of PE with respect to
network’s strategy parameter, λ.
Lemma 1. For a given σws and σwfc , PE is a quasiconvex
function of λ.
Proof: Treating σws and σwfc as constants, we differ-
entiate PE with respect to λ and simplify the expression as
follows.
∂PE
∂λ
= p0
∂QF
∂λ
− p1 ∂QD
∂λ
= r1(λ) · {p1 · r2(λ) − p0}
(12)
where
r1(λ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− λ
2
2σ2
)
, (13a)
r2(λ) = exp


2 ·
N∑
i=1
gihi · λ− σ2
2σ2

 (13b)
Note that r1(λ) ≥ 0. Therefore, the value of r2(λ) decides
the behavior of PE . One can easily observe that r2(λ) is
an exponential function of λ and is, therefore, a monotonic
function of λ. Hence, there is only one value of λ = λ0 at
which r2(λ) = 0. This implies that
∂PE
∂λ
≥ 0, if λ ≥ λ0, and
∂PE
∂λ
< 0, otherwise. In other words, PE is a quasi-convex
function of λ.
Similarly, we investigate the behavior of PE with respect to
the interferer’s strategies in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any given CR network with fixed λ, such that
0 ≤ λ ≤
N∑
i=1
gihi (under a limiting constraint on PJ ), PE is
a monotonic function of σwfc , given σws . Similarly, PE is a
monotonic function of σws , given σwfc .
Proof: When λ ∈
[
0,
N∑
i=1
gihi
]
, it is straightforward to
show that QF (QD) is a monotonic increasing (decreasing)
function of σ2. The lemma follows from the definition of σ2
(Eqn. (6)).
It is easy to show that, given σ2, the optimal λ is of the
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Fig. 1: CR Network for p0 = 0.5 case
following form.
λopt =
1
2
N∑
i=1
gihi +
σ2
N∑
i=1
gihi
ln
p0
p1
(14)
Since the contribution of thermal noise is usually small, an
appropriate limiting constraint on PJ results in a reasonably
smaller value of σ. Then, from Equation (14), 0 ≤ λopt ≤
N∑
i=1
gihi and hence PE is a monotonic increasing function of
σws , given σwfc and similarly, vice versa.
Note that PE is still a quasi-concave function of both
σws and σwfc , as monotonicity is a special case of quasi-
concavity. Therefore, by Theorem 2, a unique saddle-point
(Nash Equilibrium) exists in the minimax game formulated
between the CR network and the interferer.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We obtain this NE numerically in this paper for the 20-
node CR network shown in Figures 1 and 2. We assume
that the FC is centered at origin (xfc = 0), PU is located
at xt = (−3,−4), interferer is at xj = (1,−2) and CRs
are randomly deployed in the 10 × 10 grid centered around
origin. We assume σs = 0.1, σfc = 0.1 and PJ = 0.5. Also,
we consider free-space path loss shadowing with any path
loss coefficient defined in the form
√
1
(1+d2
{·}
)
where d{·} is
the propagation distance between the transmitter node and the
receiver node in the above mentioned system-model.
First, in Figure 3, we present error probability as a function
of λ, σWfc and σWs for the CR network shown in Figure
1. In this case, we let p0 = 0.5, which is the worst case
performance scenario of the network. The plots depict clearly
both quasiconvexity with respect to λ and monotonicity with
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Fig. 2: CR Network for p0 = 0.8 case
respect to the attacker’s parameters, σWfc and σWs , whenever
λ ≥ 0. In this case,
λopt =
N∑
i=1
gihi
2
.
Figure 4, on the other hand, presents the error probability as
a function of λ, σWfc and σWs for p0 = 0.8. We particularly
present these results because p0 = 0.8 is found in practice as
pointed out by the FCC’s survey on spectrum utilization of
licensed bands [1]. One can clearly note that the NE of the
game from the network’s perspective has now moved away
from λ = 0 due to the bias in the prior probabilities.
One can also note from Figures 3 and 4 that in both the
scenarios considered, the optimal attack for the interferer is
to degrade the individual CRs’ performance by allocating all
the available power to the sensing channel’s noise-like signal
(σWs = 1). This corroborates our argument for the case when
the attacker is close to the CR in [9], where we presented
our analysis of a interfering attack on a given CR network.
This can also be justified intuitively because the interferer
would invest more energy in interfering the most vulnerable
channel available (one with maximum information about the
spectrum availability) in order to give maximal impact on
the network performance. Therefore, the PU-CR channel,
which carries maximum information about the true state of
the channel availability, is the most vulnerable wireless link
available for the interferer to attack and have maximal impact
on the network performance as a whole. Another important
observation is that, the figure-pairs 3a-3b and 4a-4b are mirror-
images of each other with respect to σWfc and σWs , indicating
that the interferer is spending a total of PJ units of energy,
where σWfc = PJ − σWs .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proved the existence of a solution to
the minimax problem for cooperative spectrum sensing in a
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centralized cognitive radio network in the presence of a fixed
interferer by showing that the error probability is a quasi-
convex function with respect to the network’s parameters and
a monotonic function (quasiconcave) with respect to the inter-
ferer’s parameters. We found the optimal solution numerically
in our simulation results that maximizes the objective function
with respect to the interferer’s parameters and minimizes the
same with respect to the CR network’s parameters.
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